Civil Society and Political Transition in Africa

A civil society is a truly international idea. This paper argues that there is prima facie evidence of a nascent civil society in certain African countries. But universal ideas require adaptation to take into account the distinctiveness of different world regions, notably in the level of socioeconomic development, and in the cultural attributes of different nations and sub-nations

The politics of government - NGO relations in Africa

Non-Government organizations (NGOs), deservedly or not, have established a reputation as the leading practitioners of the rural development in Africa. African governments have responded ambiguously to the presence of these new agencies, on the one hand valuing the economic resources NGOs can raise, but resisting political pluralization implied by popular development action. The paper describes the growth of NGOs in Africa and proposes a framework for analysing the dynamics of NGO-government relations. By means of examples drawn mainly from Kenya and Zimbabwe, the paper illustrates the strategies used by governments to exercise control and NGOs to assert autonomy. An argument is made that the contribution of NGOs to development, and the attitude of governments towards the voluntary sector, are determined more by political than economic considerations

Draft Power, Draft Exchange And Farmer Organizations

A DLM Working Paper describing the extent of social and economic consequences of Zimbabwe's draft exchange.Shortage of land and land reform are not the only themes in the current debate, on peasant agriculture in Zimbabwe. A central issue, particularly among agricultural economists is the shortage of draft power. A conventional view has arisen that farmers with cattle produce more crops than those without. This view is empirically grounded and logically persuasive. It fails however, to adequately address the institutional question of organized draft exchange. Arrangements have been devised by communal area farmers to provide access to draft animals, particularly for draft-deficit households. The purpose of this paper is to describe the extent of draft exchange, its institutional forms, and its social and economic consequences

Africans' surprising universalism

Africa is a latecomer to democratization. In terms of timing, Africa has followed rather than led other continents in giving birth to the reform movements that have installed elected governments, multiparty systems, and more open societies around the world. Since many African countries are dependent on foreign aid, they have also experienced weighty external pressures to liberalize. One should not automatically conclude, however, that the impetus for reform comes from outside the continent rather than from within. If political liberalization were a Northern idea being foisted on an unwilling South, then certain empirical facts should follow. One would expect Africans to 1) be unaware of the concept of democracy; 2) have distinct cultural understandings of its content; 3) be unsupportive of regimes based on competitive principles; 4) prefer alternative political regimes; and 5) be unsatisfied with the performance of democratic regimes in practice

Voting in Kenya: Putting Ethnicity in Perspective

Do Kenyans vote according to ethnic identities or policy interests? Based on results from a national probability sample survey conducted in the first week of December 2007, this article shows that, while ethnic origins drive voting patterns, elections in Kenya amount to more than a mere ethnic census. We start by reviewing how Kenyans see themselves, which is mainly in non-ethnic terms. We then report on how they see others, whom they fear will organize politically along ethnic lines. People therefore vote defensively in ethnic blocs, but not exclusively. In Decem- ber 2007, they also took particular policy issues into account, including living standards, corruption and majimbo (federalism). We demonstrate that the relative weight that individuals grant to ethnic and policy voting depends in good part on how they define their group identities, with ethnics engaging in identity voting and non-ethnics giving more weight to interests and issues

Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of \u3cem\u3eThe Modern Corporation\u3c/em\u3e’s Last Chapter

Readers game enough to work through all three hundred pages of The Modern Corporation and Private Property looking for insights on corporate law today encounter two, apparently contradictory, lines of thought. One line, set out in Books II and III, resonates comfortably with today’s shareholder-centered corporate legal theory. Here the book teaches that even as ownership and control have separated, managers should function as trustees for the shareholders and so should exercise their wide-ranging powers for the shareholders’ benefit. The other line of thought emerges in Books I and IV, where The Modern Corporation encases this shareholder trust model in discussions of corporate power and social welfare. These discussions resonate today with those who advocate corporate social responsibility. Here, the separation of ownership and control implies public responsibilities: “It is entirely possible . . . that the corporate profit stream in reality no longer is private property, and that claims on it must be adjusted by some test other than that of property right.

Bankers and Chancellors

The Delaware Chancery Court recently squared off against the investment banking world with a series of rulings that tie Revlon violations to banker conflicts of interest. Critics charge the Court with slamming down fiduciary principles of self-abnegation in a business context where they have no place or, contrariwise, letting culpable banks off the hook with ineffectual slaps on the wrist. This Article addresses this controversy, offering a sustained look at the banker-client advisory relationship. We pose a clear answer to the questions raised: although this is nominally fiduciary territory, both banker-client relationships and the Chancery Court’s recent interventions are contractually driven. At the same time, conflicts of interest are wrought into banker-client relationships: the structure of the advisory sector makes them hard to avoid and clients, expecting them, make allowances. Advisor banks emerge in practice as arm’s length counterparties constrained less by rules of law than by a market for reputation. Meanwhile, the boards of directors that engage bankers clearly are fiduciaries in law and fact and company sales processes implicate enhanced scrutiny of their performance under Revlon. Revlon scrutiny, however, is less about traditional fiduciary self-abnegation than about diligence in getting the best deal for the shareholders. The Chancery Court’s banker cases treat conflicts in a contractual rather than fiduciary frame, standing for the proposition that a client with a Revlon duty has no business consenting to a conflict and then passively trusting that the conflicted fiduciary will deal in the best of faith. The client should instead treat the banker like an arm’s length counterparty, assuming self-interested motivation on the banker’s part and using contract to protect itself and its shareholders. As a doctrinal and economic matter, the banker cases are about taking contract seriously and getting performance incentives properly aligned, and not about traditional fiduciary ethics. They deliver considerably more than a slap on the wrist, having already ushered in a demonstrably stricter regime of conflict management in sell-side boardrooms. They also usher in the Delaware Chancery Court itself as a focal point player in the market for banker reputation. The constraints of the reputational market emerge as more robust in consequence